A Policy of Ambiguity: The Indian Approach to Refugees
By Mehar Chhabra
A Policy of Ambiguity: The Indian Approach to Refugees
By Mehar Chhabra
The 21st century is marred by civil wars, political unrest and widespread displacement. Fraught with threats of persecution and violence, millions of people are forced to flee their homes daily. For these people to guarantee themselves security of life, the best course of action is to often leave their homes. This loss of a ‘home’ further compounds itself into a loss of identity, safety and a sense of belonging. These characteristics are some prerequisites of being a refugee. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, two-thirds of refugees under their mandate are from four countries: Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Ukraine and Afghanistan. With 37.9 million refugees looking for asylum and refuge, the devastating effects of state collapse and human displacement are evident (UNHCR, 2024).
The 1951 Refugee Convention was the first international attempt at designating a framework for refugee protection. It sought to safeguard those displaced after World War II. Manuvie (2019) believes, however, that its Eurocentric focus was evident in its limitations — restriction of the scope of events to before January 1, 1951 and it primarily addressed state-sponsored persecution. India, despite being a country with a notable presence on the international stage with global aspirations chose to not sign the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Moreover, it does not have a constitutionally mandated refugee policy either, thereby exempting it from any international and political obligations in the treatment it meets out to these vulnerable communities. Thus, this essay serves as an attempt to explore the refugee policy of India or rather the lack of it. The Indian refusal to formalize its approach to refugees has resulted in an ad-hoc treatment of refugees. This paper examines the ambiguity surrounding India’s refugee framework by viewing it through the lens of regionalism and a preference for bilateral cooperation. It further seeks to analyze the implications of this approach for domestic security, international relations and human rights by taking into account archival narratives.
Objectives
By exploring the historical, political and economic factors that shaped the decision to not sign the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, this research aims to critically evaluate the motivating factors, through archival records of leaders of the domestic frontiers and the international stage. Additionally, it evaluates the rationale used by the Indian government when confronting the influx of refugees during the Partition of India (1947) and the Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) into India. By examining India’s case-specific responses to various refugee groups, the study aims to understand the implications of this approach on domestic security and international relations.
Literature Review
The government of India has a history of keeping its opinions subjective when considering the plight and consequent action plans for refugees. The percolation of refugees through various borders into India without an official refugee policy complicates matters of daily life for both citizens and non-citizens. For people seeking refuge, the criteria of what a ‘safe haven’ is, are easy to conceptualise. It looks like a country that has a history of accepting refugees, providing ample opportunities for growth and development and guaranteeing safety and security to the best of its ability. This ‘safe-haven’ is India. However, the treatment meted out to refugees is decided on an ad hoc basis, meaning India chooses its style of treatment on a ‘case by case’ basis. Some of these cases look like refugees from the partition, displaced East Bengali refugees during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 and Rohingya Muslims.
In a paper published by the Indian National Bar Association, it is mentioned how India isn’t a signatory to the Geneva Convention in 1951 or the ‘1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’. However, it adopts an obligatory position on the Indian government's treatment of refugees through its support of ‘a number of United Nations and World Conventions on Human Rights, refugee issues and related matters.’ This reads as an attempt to justify the lack of a comprehensive policy, by seeking to shift the magnitude to that of a refugee policy as being similar to that of ‘related matters’ without establishing what these matters look like. India's engagement with the Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees in 1966 owing to its membership in the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization showcases its intent to engage with global norms without committing to a clear policy.
The dynamic between the government and the media is a complex one. In the absence of a constitutionally mandated refugee policy, the media holds paramount importance in circulating narratives, shaping public opinion, and strengthening their legitimacy. The media representation of the 1971 humanitarian crises reflected the deeper political and ideological currents in the nation. Jawaharlal Nehru’s stand on refugee migration was paradoxical; he publicly condemned the influx of Hindu refugees from Pakistan, arguing that their presence in India would present a threat to India’s evolving nationhood, posing as potential economic liabilities instead of victims. The reporting of this crisis from sections of the English India Press, such as the Illustrated Weekly, further echoed the prevailing government sentiments, undermining the reality of violence faced by refugee communities. An article published by the Illustrated Weekly in July 1971 was headlined ‘Not wanted in Pakistan’. The relationship between the Indian government and the media thus reflected a harsh reality wherein the former exercised significant power over the latter to further obscure the problems faced by vulnerable communities and speak to a broader trend of media arrangement with the dominant political parties, affecting public discourse and response to a humanitarian crisis. Consequently, the existing power dynamic does not just distort public perception around the sensitization of refugee communities but also creates barriers that inhibit formal discussions around establishing guidelines, since the media is the instrument used to portray national policies and generate productive discourse.
Thus, the absence of a formalized and clear refugee policy hampers any efforts to address the needs of those seeking safety. As India confronts its identity as a ‘safe-haven’, it is crucial for the government and the media to establish clear guidelines that uphold human rights.
Methodology
This research paper adopts a qualitative archival approach, by utilizing sources spanning India, the United States of America, Tibet and Bangladesh from 1947 to 1971. These sources include but are not limited to government records and archives which help gauge differing perspectives on India’s approach to refugee policy which include the 1972 report by the Agency for International Development Department of State authored by the Comptroller General of the United States and inferences from archival speeches by Jawaharlal Nehru.
This study draws its inferences from works of experts in the fields of sociology and political philosophy such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Myron Weiner. As stated by the Princeton University Press, Professor Weiner was interested in India’s democratic experiment in the early 1950s and wrote extensively about political governance and the Gandhian principle of Satyagraha. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was post-colonial India’s first and longest-serving Prime Minister (Indian National Congress). He also served as the External Affairs Minister, making him adept in the disciplines of foreign policy and international governance (Haque 2017). Nehru’s speeches and interactions in his capacity as Prime Minister are considered representative of the stance of the Indian Government.
International organizations such as the United Nations and governments like the United States reports and policies have also been analyzed, to ensure an availability of a multitude of perspectives. These official records reflect the positions, policy decisions and strategies of these stakeholders during the periods and events under study. Scholarly discourse was accessed and analysed through publicly accessible sources such as Abhilekh Patal (archival repository) and the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, Volume 48 (April 1 - 30, 1959).
Bilateral agreements such as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact and reports detailing international assistance and India’s responses to the refugee crises of 1947 and 71 were subject to content analysis to identify themes of regionalism and international interference. Additionally, secondary sources such as academic analyses of the aforementioned primary documents were incorporated to help provide context and understand discourse. The content analysis resulted in an identification of political concepts of sovereignty, fiscal policies and regional tensions, by juxtaposing the Indian perspective with the international response.
Owing to the archival nature of this research, ethical considerations were only encountered when ensuring an accurate representation of the primary sources. Since this study did not involve any interactions with participants, there was significant ease in identifying and respecting ethical boundaries.
Analysis
India’s refusal to sign the internationally agreed conventions may be viewed as an attempt to exercise agency on its own established modus operandi of refugee treatment. This modus operandi came into being as a result of one of the biggest crises that faced the newly independent Republic — the Partition of 1947.
As Myron Weiner writes in Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia, this bloody migration led to the loss of millions, making it one of the bloodiest refugee crises in world history (1737). There were around six to seven million Muslims who moved from India to Pakistan and nearly eight million Hindus and Sikhs who moved from Pakistan to India, according to the Census of India 1951. The sheer magnitude of this movement necessitates the idea of the Partition to be conceived as more than an act of ‘drawing of a line on a map’. Instead, it must be viewed as a social restructuring on religious lines, birthing one of the gravest refugee crises to face India. To alleviate the rampant distress felt nationwide, here India adopted a preference for bilateral relationships and regional frameworks when tackling the question of refugees. As elicited by Pallavi Raghavan (2020), the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950 was readily signed by India which sought to address the massive bilateral flow of refugees following the Partition. It did so by establishing reciprocal commitments for the protection of minority rights in both India and Pakistan. This bilateral effort can be viewed as a willingness and initiative to address refugee issues within a regional framework, also owing to the lack of an international framework to deal with refugees and asylum seekers during 1947.
However, post-1947, India's reluctance to engage with the 1951 Refugee Convention raises questions. The fear of unnecessary interference in what India regards as an “internal matter”, forced Jawaharlal Nehru to not sign the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol (Manuvie 2019). There was scepticism to this international framework which was thought to be Eurocentric and ill-suited to the Asian context, due to its inability to ‘attribute a more liberal meaning to the term ‘refugee’ to include internally displaced people or those displaced due to social rifts’ (Manuvie 2019). The Convention’s definition of refugees as victims of “state-supported persecution” excluded those displaced by social persecution which is what the Partition was perceived to be by Indians and Pakistanis alike.
Binayak Sen (1992) elaborates in Protection of Refugees: Bangkok Principles and After that during the 1964 session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, it became evident that the 1951 Convention's framework was inadequate for the unique refugee crises in South Asia. However, this inadequacy did not mean India was going to practice abstinence in alignment with a multi-regional framework concerning refugee treatment. Thus, India affirmed the Bangkok Principles of 1966, which was equipped to handle the concerns and reservations India had with international legislation. This was a regional initiative which accommodated broader refugee definitions, affirming its preference for regional mechanisms over international ones.
India’s handling of refugees during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War further exemplifies the pragmatic approach it sought to adopt. Attempts to balance humanitarian obligations with economic and political concerns were diluted by the influx of nearly 10 million refugees from East Pakistan into India. The 1972 report by the Agency for International Development Department of State authored by the Comptroller General of the United States stated that this influx would mean a significant economic strain on India (5). The government of India estimated costs equivalent to 8% of its annual development budget. Despite receiving support and international aid, India maintained strict control over the refugee relief programs through its Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation. Archival records reveal India’s reluctance to allow foreign or UN personnel to directly be placed within and monitor refugee camps, thus echoing its previous fear of international interference in ‘internal’ matters (24).
Even when seeking international support, India’s focus remained on repatriation rather than long-term absorption of the East Pakistani refugees (6). The 1972 U.S. report on refugee assistance noted that India planned for short-term aid while emphasizing repatriation to avoid long-term demographic and economic impacts. While international donors like the World Bank and the United States contributed significantly, India's insistence on autonomy in administering aid programs demonstrates its discomfort with external oversight.
However, this duality of the expression of autonomy raises the question of how India wishes to be perceived on the international arena. The exercise of autonomy in managing refugee relief programs, occurs concurrently with aiming to address the accountability expected by international donors. This juxtaposition reveals a calculated effort to manage geopolitical and economic priorities while maintaining autonomy in internal affairs.
Its support for regional frameworks like the Bangkok Principles and bilateral agreements like the Nehru-Liaquat Pact highlight a strategic preference for localized, context-specific solutions. This aims to answer the question of how India wishes to assert itself in the paradigm of international policies. India’s scepticism toward the 1951 Refugee Convention and its cautious engagement with international aid during the 1971 crisis also signify its broader discomfort with external interference. By prioritizing bilateral and regional solutions, India has sought to navigate complex refugee challenges in a manner that aligns with its economic realities, political interests, and overarching emphasis on sovereignty.
Discussion
This study served as an attempt to understand the multi-faceted approach adopted by policymakers of newly independent India to represent its aspirations, when faced with a crisis as grave as that of a refugee crisis. However, pursuing a study of such a complicated facet of a country as diverse as India was met with a lot of challenges. Although there is extensive research on the matter, access to the primary documents of such research was difficult, owing to its classified nature. Moreover, the risk of cherry-picking runs high when considering arguments and analysis, as the sheer volume of research is enormous. This makes it impossible to ensure a complete representation of all viewpoints. Moreover, topics like the Partition and the refugee crisis posed additional challenges as these are events which generate intense feelings of passion and fervour, owing to their sensitivity. This expression of human emotion might have tampered with the availability of unbiased information, which informed my research. Additionally, a lack of direct quotations and detailed archival material further limited the depth of analysis.
Conclusion
This study aimed to showcase India’s preference for bilateral agreements and regional approaches over international policies in managing refugees. Its resistance to global interference reflects its stance that refugee issues are internal matters. This research is fundamental in understanding India’s unique refugee approach and the historical and political causal factors behind it. It sheds light on how India balances humanitarian concerns with security and economic priorities. This study adds to the discussion on refugee management by exploring India’s perspective, in light of its neighbouring countries too. It highlights the need for further research into regional frameworks and the challenges of creating inclusive refugee policies.
However, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) as amended in 2019 challenges India’s regional preferential approach and the secular values of its Constitution. By excluding persecuted groups like Rohingya Muslims and Sri Lankan Tamils while favoring specific religious communities, the CAA undermines India’s history of addressing refugee issues through bilateral cooperation such as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. As mentioned in a report by Amnesty International (2024), the Act’s bias complicates relations with neighboring countries by disregarding their diverse refugee concerns. It also moves away from the inclusive, secular principles that have shaped India’s diplomatic and regional policies, creating tensions in managing refugee crises.
This study highlighted the complexities of India’s refugee approach, but several questions remain unanswered.
Future research should examine how India’s bilateral and regional frameworks can be strengthened to address emerging refugee challenges in South Asia. Additionally, exploring the long-term socio-economic impacts of refugee policies on host communities could provide deeper insights too. The role of society and non-governmental organizations in shaping refugee discourse also warrants closer investigation, especially as they often serve as the middle men between the oppressor and the oppressed. Comparative studies between India and other nations with similar economic and social structures approaches could illuminate alternative strategies, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Finally, assessing the implications of legislative changes like the CAA on India's international standing and bilateral relations is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of its refugee policy.
Bibliography
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Mehar Chhabra is an undergraduate student pursuing Political Science and International Relations with interdisciplinary interests in sociology and psychology. Her research focuses on marginalised communities through an intersectional lens, examining how overlapping identities shape political and social experiences. She is particularly drawn to policy analysis that addresses systemic inequalities and their real world impacts on vulnerable populations.